Patent Law Reform: A Legislative Perspective of an Extended Gestation by Scott, Hugh & Unkovic, Dennis
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 4 Article 10
Patent Law Reform: A Legislative Perspective of an
Extended Gestation
Hugh Scott
Dennis Unkovic
Copyright c 1975 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Hugh Scott and Dennis Unkovic, Patent Law Reform: A Legislative Perspective of an Extended
Gestation, 16 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 937 (1975), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss4/10
PATENT LAW REFORM: A LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF
AN EXTENDED GESTATION
SEN. HUGH ScoTr* AND DENNIS UNKOVIC**
The movement to reform the patent law of the United States has
been a tremendously complicated legislative effort. Despite general
agreement that patent law needs rejuvenation, disagreement re-
mains concerning the necessary degree and kind of alteration. Hope-
fully the long-awaited reform bill soon will be at hand; chances that
the present Congress will pass such a bill seem better than at any
time in recent years.
This Article will examine attempts during the past 23 years to
legislate a comprehensive patent reform bill and will examine cur-
rently proposed legislation, especially the Administration proposals.
It is hoped that this examination will illuminate the forces at work
in the legislative process which at some times have frustrated, and
at others enhanced, the opportunity for passage of a comprehensive
reform package. Particular attention has been given to the impact
of various agencies of the executive branch on legislative proposals
and to the pressures brought to bear upon Congress by interested
groups outside government. A clear understanding of the framework
in which Congress must make its judgments helps to explain the
need for the lengthy process of accommodation and compromise
inherent in the reform of a major body of well established law.
BACKGROUND: 1952 TO 1973
Since passage of the original Patent Act of 1836,1 the essential
structure of the United States patent system has remained unal-
tered.2 Although Congress made some changes in 1952 when it en-
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ferson B. Hill, Trial Attorney, Patent Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice.
Mr. Hill has been involved in efforts for patent reform on behalf of the Department of Justice
since 1970.
1. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, as amended, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
2. SUtCOMA. ON PATENTS, TRADEmaRKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDI-
CIARY, RVIEW OF THE AMmcAN PATENT SYsTEM, S. REP. No. 1964, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
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acted the Patent Code as Title 35 of the United States Code,3 it did
not attempt comprehensive reform,' but only a codification of pat-
ent law.5 For 12 years thereafter, numerous efforts were made to
produce a true patent reform package. Under the leadership of
Chairman O'Mahoney, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights undertook an extensive anal-
ysis of the patent system.' Between 1956 and 1963 the Subcommit-
tee published 30 research papers prepared by professional staff
members and experts from outside the government.' These studies
constituted a comprehensive analysis of areas of the patent law
particularly in need of reform. After Senator John L. McClellan
became Chairman of the Subcommittee in 1961, the Subcommittee
continued to examine the need for substantive reform.
The catalyst which sparked measurable progress was President
Johnson's appointment of a President's Commission on the Patent
System in 1965, the 14 members of the Commission representing
private inventors, industry, and government agencies directly con-
cerned with the patent system.10 Contained in the Commission's
report transmitted to President Johnson in 1966, were 35 broad
recommendations for revision of the patent system." President
Johnson directed the Commerce Department and the Justice De-
partment to consider the report and develop appropriate legislative
proposals.1 2 Because most of the Commission's recommendations
(1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 SuBcoMwrrE REmnw].
3. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
4. 1956 SuacompinrrEE REVmw, supra note 2, at 12-13.
5. 98 CoNG. REC. 9323 (1952); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1966); Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 365 U.S. 336, 347 n.2 (1961); Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 n.10 (1972).
6. Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Democrat, Wyoming.
7. Chairman O'Mahoney conducted exploratory hearings on the American patent system
before commissioning research studies. Hearings Entitled "American Patent System" Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The Subcommittee reached preliminary conclusions
as a result of these hearings in 1956. 1956 SUtcoMrUTTE REVIEw, supra note 2.
8. STUDIEs O THE SuBcorMrITTEE ON PATENTS, TMRETADES, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
CohnwrrrE ON THE JUDIcIARY, Nos. 1-30.
9. Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas.
10. Exec. Order No. 11,215, 3 C.F.R. 299 (1964-65).
11. See Sutcomb. ON PATENTS, TRADEmARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. OF THE
JUDIcIARY, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, REPORT OFTHEPRESIDENT'S Coh IsSIoN
ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
12. See Presidential Message of Feb. 21, 1967, H.R. Doc. No. 59, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. IV
(1967).
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required legislative initiative, the Administration developed a legis-
lative proposal, the Patent Reform Act of 1967, which Senator
McClellan introduced by request.13 Though both the Department of
Justice and the Department of Commerce spoke for the President's
legislation at hearings in the House and Senate,15 the close cooper-
ation between the Departments was not to last.
In response to the introduction of the Johnson Administration bill
and the hearings that followed, two other bills were introduced in
the 90th Congress. The late Senator Everett Dirksen5 introduced
legislation developed by the Patent Section of the American Bar
Association (ABA) and publicly supported by the American Patent
Law Association (APLA). 17 This bill contained less radical recom-
mendations than the Johnson Administration bill and ignored many
of the Presidential Commission's suggestions. In mid-spring of 1968,
Chairman McClellan suggested a substitute" for the Administra-
tion bill as a compromise between the Administration's proposals
and those put forth by the ABA and the APLA in testimony at the
House and Senate hearings."9 Following a large response to his re-
quest for comment regarding the proposed substitute," Senator
McClellan introduced a new bill' that closely tracked the APLA-
approved direction of Senator Dirksen's proposal. Support by the
Commerce Department for the original Administration bill became
less visible as the 90th Congress progressed, but the 90th Congress
13. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). In the House, the bill became H.R. 5924, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
When a bill is introduced "by request," it is introduced as an accommodation to someone.
A Chairman of a Committee or Subcommittee often will introduce legislation by request for
an Administration. A sponsor of legislation introduced by request is by no means required to
support or vote for the legislation at any time subsequent to introduction. He is completely
free to offer amendments at anytime to the bill.
14. Hearings on H.R. 5924 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1967-68).
15. Hearings on S. 1042, S. 1377, and S. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1967-68).
16. Senator Everett Dirksen, Republican, Illinois.
17. S. 2597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
18. S. 1042[S.P.], Proposed Substitute for S. 1042, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The
designations "[S.]" and "[C.P.]" indicate that a bill is a "Subcommittee Print" or a
"Committee Print." These "prints" may differ significantly from the original bill which had
the same basic numerical identification.
19. See notes 14, 15 supra.
20. S. 1042[S.P.], 90th Cong., 2d Sees. (1968).
21. S. 3892, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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adjourned with no resolution of the conflicting proposals.
With the commencement of the 91st Congress in 1969 and the new
Nixon Administration, there occurred a significant non-event: the
original Administration bill of the 90th Congress did not reappear.
Rather, Chairman McClellan advanced a bill2 which closely resem-
bled the private bar proposal of the earlier Congress. Several days
later, Senator Dirksen introduced legislationO which was essentially
the same as the bill he had introduced in the 90th Congress. For five
months after the introduction of the McClellan bill, there was no
Administration comment or overt attempt to reintroduce the John-
son Administration bill. The ABA and APLA took the opportunity
to study the McClellan bill and lobby for modification to lower the
substantive standards of patent law. On August 1, 1969, Senator
McClellan introduced a new bill, S. 2756,2 which raised highly
significant issues not suggested by his earlier proposal in the same
Congress.25
With ABA and APLA support, two amendments to S. 2756 were
introduced in April 1970 to deal with the application of the antitrust
laws to the licensing of patents and the relationship of federal pat-
ent law to the state law of trade secrets.2 Publicly, the Justice and
Commerce Departments had no comment on either the amend-
ments or S. 2756, although the subsequent public dispute between
those two Departments2l strongly suggests that disagreement ex-
isted even earlier. Because the Administration took no position, the
22. S. 1246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
23. S. 1569, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
24. S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
25. S. 2756 suggested for the first time significant changes in Patent Code sections 102
(novelty), 103 (standard of invention), 120 (benefit of earlier filing date in the United States),
and 282 (presumption of validity). The Department of Justice later testified that such
changes "could subvert the Constitutional purposes of the patent system and unsettle over
120 years of judicial precedent." Hearings onS. 643, S. 1253 and S. 1255 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 491 (1971).
26. S. 2756, Amendment No. 578, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 261 (1970), would allow a patent
applicant or patentee not only the right to assign his application or patent by a written
instrument, but also the option of granting a license to any part of his rights, regardless of
anticompetitive impact or other violation of existing law. The amendment also set out the
rights of the various parties after an assignment or grant of rights in terms that would modify
or reverse several Supreme Court precedents. S. 2756, Amendment No. 579, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 301 (1970), was intended to make clear, in terms that again limited Supreme Court
precedent, that the bill was not to preempt state and federal law regarding contracts, trade
secrets, or unfair competition.
27. See note 33 infra & accompanying text.
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bill did not proceed further in the 91st Congress.2s
Soon after Senator McClellan introduced S. 643,29 a slightly modi-
fied version of S. 2756, early in the 92d Congress, the amendments
regarding patent licensing" and state trade secret law"' were rein-
troduced. Hearings were conducted in May 1971 before the Senate
Patents Subcommittee on the two amendments and other issues, 2
one purpose of the hearings being to elicit agency comments. During
the hearings, the inability of the Justice and Commerce Depart-
ments to agree regarding S. 643 and its amendments became clearly
evident when each Department was allowed to present its own view
rather than a single Administration position.33 The Commerce De-
partment supported S. 643 and modified versions of the amend-
ments, while the Justice Department opposed the amendments and
critical sections of S. 643.
After the hearings, the Subcommittee reported S. 643[C.P.], 31 an
amended version of S. 643, to the full Senate Judiciary Committee.
The revised bill did not adopt the patent-licensing amendment, and
it substantially narrowed the trade secret amendment. It rejected
the changes S. 643 would have made in existing law concerning the
presumption of validity for issued patents," the "obviousness" stan-
dard of invention,- the requirement of novelty,31 the requirement of
28. Often in areas as complex and technically oriented as the patent system, the Congress
is reluctant to move forward without at least receiving the opinions of affected executive
branch agencies.
29. S. 643, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
30. S. 643, Amendment No. 24, 92d Cong., Ist Ses. (1971), was identical to S. 2756,
Amendment No. 578, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 261 (1970); see note 26 supra.
31. S. 643, Amendment No. 23, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see note 26 supra.
32. Hearings on S. 643, S. 1253, and S. 1265Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1971).
33. Id. at 229. On any given issue, an Administration normally seeks to present a uniform
front. Espousal outside an Administration of conflicting views by two or more Departments
is rare.
34. S. 643[C.P.], 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
35. Id. § 282.
36. Id. § 103. For an invention to be patentable, the improvement the invention makes over
prior technology must not have been an obvious improvement. See Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966); Note, After Blonder-Tongue: Bach to the Laboratory To Find a
Patent Validation System Even a Court Could Trust, 16 Wr. & MARY L. REV. 295, 319-21
(1975) [hereinafter cited as After Blonder-Tongue]. See generally Voorhees, A Summary of
Patent Law for the General Practitioner, 20 DAKE L. Rav. 227 (1971).
37. S. 643[C.P.], 92d Cong., 1 Sess. § 102 (1971). A patent may not be obtained if the
inventor derived the subject matter sought to be patented from another or if the invention
previously was disclosed in certain ways. See Voorhees, supra note 36.
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utility," and the rules of discovery available in contests before the
Patent Office."9 The Subcommittee strengthened the required oath
of invention and made submission of a patentability brief manda-
tory." In addition, the Committee Print deleted from S. 643 an
arbitration provision and a provision limiting the expanded applica-
tion of collateral estoppel effected in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation." It also increased the op-
portunity for third parties to present evidence of patentability to the
Patent Office while the patent application was pending.2
The controversial nature of the changes made to S. 643 and of
some of the provisions retained in S. 643[C.P.] combined with the
lack of a unified Administration position to produce unfavorable
conditions for Senate action. Thus the third Congress in succession
failed to move patent reform beyond the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee. In fact, patent reform was regressing. During the 90th Congress
the Administration had been advocating its own package of reform
measures; six years later it had neither a bill of its own 3 nor an
official position on pending legislation.
On September 21, 1972, Senators McClellan and Scott, the rank-
ing majority and minority members of the Senate Patents Subcom-
mittee, jointly requested President Nixon to "direct the appropriate
departments and agencies of the executive branch to undertake
renewed efforts to formulate an Administration position on patent
law revision."44 They asked for some preliminary position by the
38. S. 643[C.P.], 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 100 (1971). An invention is not patentable unless
it is practically useful in a concrete, tangible form. See Voorhees, supra note 36.
39. S. 643[C.P.], 92d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 23, 24 (1971).
40. Id. §§ 115, 131. Under the revised oath of invention the inventor and all those who
substantially participated in prosecuting the application were required to set forth their
actual knowledge about the originality of the invention.
41. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Before Blonder-Tongue, the doctrine of collateral estoppel permit-
ted a patentee whose patent had been invalidated in an infringement suit to initiate a
subsequent suit against a different alleged infringer without being estopped by the prior
adjudication of invalidity. Because the second alleged infringer was not a party to the first
action, the requirement of mutuality prevented his benefitting from the prior holding of
invalidity as a defense in the second suit. Blonder-Tongue largely overruled the outdated
requirement of mutuality. See After Blonder-Tongue, supra note 36.
42. S. 643[C.P.], 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 192 (1971).
43. Substitutes for the original Administration bill, S. 1042, had done no better in Congress
because they, like S. 1042, had controversial sections which raised the standard of invention
to reflect current information retrieval and technical standards.
44. Letter from Sen. John L. McClellan and Sen. Hugh Scott to President Richard M.
Nixon, September 21, 1972.
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time the 93d Congress convened in January. 5 Although it was to
take one year and eight days for the Administration to return to the
Senate with a new position, the stage had been set for the intricate
machinations of patent reform during the 93d Congress.
PATENT REFORM IN THE 93D CONGRESS
Effort to reform patent law was more intense during the 93d Con-
gress than in any Congress since the patent law was codified." Intro-
duced in the Senate were three major bills that presented clearly
distinct approaches to the demonstrated need for reform. The rea-
sons for the introduction of these bills, the tactics employed to gain
acceptance in the Senate, and the Senate disposition of the bills
well illustrate the legislative process.
His interest having been aroused by the controversy in 1971 over
the patent-licensing and trade secret amendments to S. 643," Sena-
tor Philip Hart, 8 a member of the Patents Subcommittee and
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
injected into patent law reform an antitrust perspective with his
introduction of S. 1321. 41 His bill contained no licensing provisions,
but did include several provisions which dramatically would have
changed existing patent law practice and procedure. Among these
were a pre-issuance opposition procedure," a "Public Counsel" in
the Patent Office to oppose weak applications," full and specific
public disclosure of the alleged invention,52 maintenance fees,53 pow-
ers of subpoena,54 and deposition procedures. " Never before had
45. Id.
46. See note 5 supra & accompanying text.
47. See notes 30, 31 supra.
48. Senator Philip A. Hart, Democrat, Michigan.
49. S. 1321, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
50. Id. § 135. Under this provision, "any party" could notify the Commissioner of informa-
tion bearing on the patentability of any claim after application but before the issuance of a
patent.
51. Id. § 3(d). This provision was intended to ensure rigorous application of the patentabil-
ity standards by allowing the Public Counsel to act as an advocate in an adversary process.
52. Id. §§ 112, 115. Section 112 required an applicant to file a complete description of his
invention. Section 115 required the applicant to file an oath of invention stating that he was
"aware of no prior public use or other material information which would adversely affect the
issuance of the patent to him...."
53. Id. § 41. This section required a patentee to pay a fee to maintain Iis patent beginning
the fourth year after issuance of the patent.
54. Id. § 23. This section allowed any party at any time to apply to the presiding official
of a Patent Office proceeding for subpoenas or other papers ordering discovery.
1975 943
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such an extensive compilation of reforms been put in one package.
Despite Senator Hart's comment while introducing his bill that
patent law generally stimulated little public interest,5 his proposal
sparked a sharp adverse reaction from the private patent bar, many
corporations, the American Patent Law Association, sections of the
American Bar Association, and various local patent law groups.r
Essentially, opponents argued that the bill was too far reaching for
what were dismissed as small problems with the patent system and
called for hearings on proposals which allegedly had never before
been subjects of Congressional inquiry." In an attempt to force Sub-
committee action on his bill, Senator Hart received permission from
Chairman McClellan to hold hearings on the five major topics.59
During the three days of hearings at which a large number of wit-
nesses testified, the remarkable point brought forth by the testi-
mony was the total lack of agreement among the private bar, var-
ious corporate patent counsel, and inventors. The hearings ended
without indicating any clear-cut path for future reform.
The second major patent reform bill of the 93d Congress resulted
from the request by Senators McClellan and Scott for the Nixon
55. Id. § 24. This section empowered the Public Counsel to compel the giving of depositions
for Patent Office proceedings.
56. "Mr. President, if we were measuring the 'potential boredom rate' of various topics for
conversation on a scale of I to 100, patents would probably get a 99." 119 CONG. REc. S9101
(1973) (remarks of Senator Hart).
57. At this point the Administration still had neither a position on S.1321 nor a bill of its
own. Later, the Administration did support publicly certain aspects of S.1321.
58. In fact, a number of these proposals, most notably those concerning maintenance fees,
opposition proceedings, and public counsel previously had been the subject of either hearings
or congressionally funded research studies. See, P. FREDERICO, RENWAL FEES AND OTHER
PATENT FEES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, STUDY No. 17 oF THE SUBcoMtM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF TH SENATE COMM. ON TE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); V.
EDWARDS, PATENT OFmCE FEEs-A LEGIATmVE His'oRY, STUDY No. 13 OF THE SuncoiM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF TE SENATE COMM. ON TE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958); P. FREDERco, OPPOSrIoN AND REvOCATION PROCEEDINGS IN PATENT CASES,
STUDY No. 4 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); V. BusH, PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE
PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No.1 OF THE SUBCoMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMRKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THlE SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 84th Cong., 2d Ses. (1956); TEMPoRARy NATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC COMMrITEE, MONOGRAPH No. 31, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1941).
59. Hearings on S. 1321 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The topics included the
following: public adversary hearings, creation of the office of the Public Counsel, deferred
examination of patent applications, revision of patent fees including the establishment of
maintenance fees, administrative restructuring of the Patent Office including its establish-
ment as an independent agency. Id.
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Administration to take some position on patent reform." Four
months after that request, the Council on Economic Policy' di-
rected the Departments of Justice and Commerce to reconcile'past
differences and formulate a cohesive Administration approach. A
working group met almost weekly for three months examining a
broad range of issues"2 raised by previous patent reform efforts, by
Senator Hart, and by draft proposals being circulated by the private
bar. 3 By mid-May 1973, several issues of critical importance re-
mained unresolved by the group, necessitating arbitratibn by the
White House through the Council on Economic Policy and the top
officials of the two Departments involved. The Justice Department
was represented by Assistaiit Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division Thomas E. Kauper; the Commerce Department, by its
General Counsel, Karl E. Bakke. Kenneth Dam, Executive Director
of the Council on Economic Policy, mediated some of the differences
that had been irreconcilable at earlier working-group sessions. Al-
though the initial positions of the two Departments are not part of
the public record, it is safe to assume that the issues which were not
solved in 1971 still plagued the policymakers and that fresh disputes
had arisen concerning Senator Hart's proposal.
Following submission of briefing papers on each issue in dispute,64
meetings at the White House commenced in mid-July and contin-
ued throughout the summer on a frequent basis. By the time of the
Hart hearings in September, 5 all but one of the issues had been
resolved, 8 the patent licensing provision which had sparked so
60. See note 44 supra.
61. The Council on Economic Policy was the White House council which coordinated
economic policy throughout the government. In 1973, George Schultz, former Secretary of the
Treasury, was Chairman and Kenneth Dam was Executive Director.
62. See Hearings on S. 1321, entitled "Patent Law Revision," Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sees. 292 (1973).
63. The proposal being circulated by the American Patent Law Association later was
introduced with minor changes by Senator James Buckley of New York as S.2930, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974). See note 83 infra & accompanying text.
64. These briefing papers are classified as interagency contact not part of the public record
and therefore are not available under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
The papers were prepared between mid-May and late June 1973, and each included hundreds
of pages. Approximately fifty substantive and procedural issues were unresolved when White
House arbitration began.
65. Hearings on S. 1321, entitled "Patent Law Revision,"Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 169,
179, 302 (1973).
66. Id. at 179.
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much discussion in the 92d Congress remaining in dispute. At the
hearings the Justice and Commerce Departments, speaking with
one voice for the first time since 1969, announced that the Adminis-
tration would introduce its own patent reform bill in the near fu-
ture."7 The five issues 8 which were the subject of the hearing -were
discussed by Administration representatives not only in terms of
Senator Hart's bill, but also in terms of the anticipated Administra-
tion package. Concurrently, the Council on Economic Policy pre-
sented the issue on patent licensing to Cabinet officials who made
the final determination that licensing was not to be a part of the
Administration proposal. The basis for the decision not to alter
present law concerning patent licensing is not known, 9 but the deci-
sion clearly ranks as one of the most important determinations of
the Cabinet-level final arbitration preceding submission of the legis-
lation.
During mid-September, Administration representatives re-
quested Senator John McClellan, Chairman of the Subcommittee,
and Senator Hugh Scott, the ranking minority member, to intro-
duce the Administration's patent bill. After Senator McClellan de-
clined, and after closely reviewing the elements of the bill, Senator
Scott submitted the Administration's patent reform bill, S. 2504, in
October 1974.70 In his introductory remarks, he pointed out that
substantive reform was needed because the basic structure of the
patent system had not been changed since the Patent Act of 1836.71
He then noted his reservations about section 147 of the Administra-
67. Id. at 169.
68. See note 59 supra.
69. In his explanation of the Administration bill to Congress, President Nixon stated:
In addition, the existing state of case law on antitrust standards for patent
licensing that have been determined by the courts would not be changed. Some
have argued that this case-by-case approach to patent licensing has increasingly
eroded the value and reliability of the patent grant. Earlier this year, I requested
that various proposals addressed to this issue be carefully studied and reviewed
by the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, and my chief advisers on
economic policy. After much study, they concluded that there is no clearly
demonstrated need or justification of anypatent licensing proposals at this time.
They also concluded that the legislation I recommend today will help counter
the loss of public confidence by improving the reliability of patents that are
issued.
9 WEEKLY COiP. OF Pans. Doc. 1198, 1201-02 (1973).
10. S. 2504, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See 119 CONG. Rac. 818,133 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1973).
71. 119 CONG. REc. S18,140 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1973).
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tion bill,72 however, and observed that he could consider S. 2504
along with other ideas "to determine the best possible future
course 73 for patent reform. The implication of this statement was
that Senator Scott was willing to entertain and even support sub-
stantive changes to S. 2504 despite his general sponsorship of the
bill.
Almost immediately after referral of the bill to the Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights in October 1973, wide-
spread interest in it was evidenced in the press and from patent
groups 74 In a speech to the American Patent Law Association on
October 11, 1973, Karl E. Bakke, General Counsel of the Commerce
Department, made the following observations concerning the Ad-
ministration bill:
The Administration's bill, embodying the result of innumerable
painstaking dialogues between the Departments of Commerce
and Justice, with mediation and conciliation by senior White
House policy advisors as needed, is one that both the Attorney
General and Secretary [of Commerce] Dent are personally
committed to.
In this connection, I know some, if not most, of you are disap-
pointed that proposals to clarify and stabilize the interface be-
tween the antitrust laws and patent licensing provisions have
not been included. I share that disappointment, but will tell you
frankly I didn't have what it took to carry the burden of persua-
sion in this area. The failure was not one of eloquence, but in
hard supporting facts. I can't disagree with the Administration
decision on this point.75
Mr. Bakke's comments reflected the concerns of those who were
interested in limiting the scope of the American antitrust laws, the
opinion that the bill in some ways would effect more sweeping pat-
ent reform than earlier bills sanctioned by the executive branch,
72. "Section 147 of the bill adds another appellate layer to existing procedures by providing
for an appeal to the circuit court of appeals following an appeal to the Patent Court. This
appears to me to be totally unnecessary and I would hope the Subcommittee would look at
this provision carefully. Since this is an administration proposal I have left the provision in
the bill but I did want my colleagues to be aware of my position regarding section 147." Id.
at S18,141.
73. Id. at S18,140.
74. See, e.g., BusiNFss WEEK, Oct. 6, 1973, at 46; N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1973, at 43, col. 7;
Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1973, at 3.
75. Address by Karl E. Bakke, Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., Oct. 11, 1973.
19751 947
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:937
and the desire for public hearings on the Administration bill before
the Subcommittee reviewed it. Following public disclosure of Sena-
tor McClellan's intent to convene an executive session of the Sub-
committee to consider general reform of the patent law,76 comment
by private inventors, members of the patent bar, organizations with
an interest in patent reform, and corporations increased markedly. 7
The introduction of S. 2504 sparked reaction by both foreign and
domestic private interest groups. Senator Scott, during January
1974, received extensive comments from the Council of European
Industrial Federations, 8 the Union of Industries of the European
Community,"° Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie,0 and Am-
basciate D'Italia.8' These communications discussed sections of the
legislation which the transmitting agencies believed would affect
international patent relations and policies. Within the United
States, conferences were held by private groups to develop a consen-
sus among members who wished to advise Congress on patent re-
76. Letter from Senator John L. McClellan to Senator Hugh Scott, Oct. 25, 1973.
77. Between October 1973 and February 1974, when S. 2504 was to be amended by the
Subcommittee, a tremendous volume of material was received by Subcommittee members
on the legislation. Many of the analyses were section-by-section commentaries with suggested
legislative language. Some were extensive compilations of comments hundreds of pages in
length. The following list is but a sampling of the sources of in-depth studies transmitted to
Subcommittee members: Corporations-Merck & Company Inc., Monsanto, Avco, Zenith,
IBM, Bell Telephone Company, Xerox, Kodak, Esso Research and Engineering Company,
3M Company, Dow Chemical Company, General Electric, Burlington Industries Inc., Ameri-
can Cyanamid Company, Dupont, PPG Industries, U.S. Steel Corporation, Rohm and Haas
Company; other groups-American Society of Inventors Inc., American Patent Law Associa-
tion, American Bar Association (Section on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights), National
Council of Patent Law Associations, Federal Bar Association, National Association of Manu-
facturers, National Chamber of Commerce, Bar Association of the District of Columbia,
American Chemical Society, Manufacturing Chemists Association, Philadelphia Patent Law
Association, Cleveland Patent Law Association, Los Angeles Patent Law Association, Michi-
gan Patent Law Association, New York Patent Law Association, Patent Law Association of
Chicago, St. Louis Bar Association, Virginia Bar Association, New Jersey Bar Association,
State Bar of Texas, Patent Law Association of San Francisco, Indiana State Bar Association,
Peninsula Patent Law Association, Dayton Patent Law Association, Rochester Patent Law
Association, Houston Patent Law Association. Besides these organizations, individual inven-
tors and members of the patent bar provided comments. By February the comments with
attachments overflowed a three-foot file drawer.
78. Letter from Francois P. Panel, President of the Patent Working Group of the Council
of European Industrial Federations to Senator Hugh Scott, Jan. 20, 1974.
79. Letter from H.M. Claessens, Secretary General, Union des Industries de la Commun-
naut6 Europeenn6 to Senator Hugh Scott, Jan. 15, 1974.
80. Letter from Dr. H. Wagner and Dr. H.H. Eberstein, Bundesverband der Deutschen
Industrie E.V. to Senator Hugh Scott, Jan. 17, 1974.
81. Memorandum from Ambasciata D'Italia to Senator Hugh Scott, Jan. 28, 1974.
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form. 2 Compilations of the results of the conferences were made
available to the Subcommittee members and the Administration,
and private lobbyists and, by request, Administration members met
frequently with Subcommittee members, their staffs, and the Sub-
committee staff.
On January 31, 1974, Senator James Buckley of New York intro-
duced the third major patent reform bill of the 93d Congress. 3 This
bill was derived from a proposal originally advanced by the Ameri-
can Patent Law Association8' and had been circulated informally to
members of the Congress for several months prior to introduction.
It was a far less ambitious legislative reform of the patent system
than those sponsored by Senators Scott or Hart. In his introductory
remarks Senator Buckley explained that the two previous bills con-
tained "costly, substantive as well as procedural provisions" which
he felt went too far."
Of the three bills, the Subcommittee decided that Senator Scott's
would be used as the basis for the attempt to report a bill to the full
Judiciary Committee. In late January under direction of their re-
spective Senators, staff legislative aides of Subcommittee members
began to analyze the recommendations that the Subcommittee had
received during the preceding three months concerning the bill. In
the course of staff meetings held several times each week, it became
increasingly clear, as controversial issues arose, that differences ex-
isted among Subcommittee members. Senators Scott, Hart, and
Burdick tended to favor tle approach of the Scott bill, S. 2504,
while Senators McClellan and Fong preferred the direction taken by
Senator Buckley. At this time, the Administration actively and
publicly supported S. 2504.
In an effort to find a ground for agreement Senators McClellan
and Scott, as Chairman and ranking Republican member of the
Subcommittee, sent a letter to President Nixon on March 25, 1974,
requesting him to authorize the recently appointed Commissioner
of Patents, C. Marshall Dann," to comment on S. 2504 and the
82. For example, the National Council of Patent Law Associations met in Arlington, Vir-
ginia on January 9, 1974, and the Federal Bar Association met in Washington, D.C. on
January 10, 1974.
83. S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
84. 120 CoNG. REc. S859 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
85. Id.
86. C. Marshall Dann had been confirmed as Commissioner by the Senate in February.
120 CONG. REc. S1593 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1974).
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proposed modifications.87 Ronald B. Brooks, Executive Director of
the Council on Economic Policy, replied to Senator Scott in early
April recommending that the Subcommittee on Patents mark up
and report an amended version of S. 2504 and promising that when
the markup was completed the Administration would comment on
any changes, with Commissioner Dann playing "a leading role" in
the response*.8
Since the Patent Commissioner would not be permitted to com-
ment as an individual to the Subcommittee members during the
markup, the Subcommittee proceeded and by early May had fin-
ished the markup. Following a number of close votes on controver-
sial issues, the Subcommittee had done major surgery on the origi-
nal S. 2504 to produce a far more complete, improved, and compre-
hensive patent reform package, S.. 2504[C.P.], s9 which was sent to
the Judiciary Committee for review.
On May 14, 1974, Senator McClellan transmitted a copy of S.
2504[C.P.] to Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent"9 and ex-
pressed "significant reservations concerning the Administration Bill
as introduced, and as reported by the Subcommittee.' "1 After refer-
ring to the March 25, 1974, letter to the President92 and the reply
from the Executive Director of the Council on Economic Policy, 3 he
requested initiation of the Commissioner of Patents' review of the
legislation which had been promised in that correspondence. 4 The
Administration then began an extensive review of the legislation
with the active participation of Commissioner Dann.
87. Letter from Senator John L. McClellan and Senator Hugh Scott to President Richard
M. Nixon, Mar. 25, 1974. Senators Scott and McClellan received an acknowledgment from
Tom C. Korologos, Deputy Assistant to the President, stating that the Senators' letter would
be called to the President's attention in the near future. Letter from Tom C. Korologos to
Senators McClellan and Scott, Mar. 26, 1974.
88. Letter from Ronald B. Brooks to Senator Scott, Apr. 8, 1974.
89. S. 2504[C.P.], 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
90. After the public distribution of S. 2504[C.P.], the Subcommittee members once again
received extensive comments from members of the patent bar, corporations, and many others
who had written earlier. As before, many preferred the approach of S. 2930 to that of S. 2504,
although most who expressed an opinion found S. 2504[C.P.] to be an improvement over S.
2504.
91. Letter from Senator John L. McClellan to Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent,
May 14, 1974.
92. See note 87 supra.
93. See note 88 supra.
94. Letter from Senator John L. McClellan to Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent,
May 14, 1974.
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Senator McClellan transmitted to the other Subcommittee mem-
bers on June 27, 1974, his individual views" which would accom-
pany a draft report on S. 2504[C.P.] to be used by the Judiciary
Committee in studying the bill. He noted that the bill had been
drafted without proper consultation by the Department of State,
members of the patent bar, members of the federal courts, and
especially the Commissioner of Patents, concluding:
S. 2504 fails to promote-in fact, will retard-the objectives
of patent law revision set forth in the Report of the President's
Commission on the Patent System. It discards beneficial provi-
sions of predecessor bills and substitutes new concepts that will
create endless uncertainty and delay. It will encourage greater
reliance on trade secrets to the detriment of the public. It will
significantly add to the costs of those who utilize the patent
system, and to those of the Government, while conferring lim-
ited benefits."
A segment of the business community desired to see an accom-
modation between the patent bar and business to allow Senate
passage during the 93d Congress. An ad hoc. group of corporate
patent counsel 7 met on several occasions during June and July
to examine S. 2504[C.P.]. At a final meeting held in Washington,
D.C., on July 16, 1974, the group wrote a series of amendments
that came to be known as the "Corporate Counsel Markup" of S.
2504[C.P.]. Their position was that corporations supporting the
group would endorse the bill publicly if the suggested amendments
were accepted by the Judiciary Committee. 8
During the time of the work of the ad hoc corporate counsel group,
the Administration replied formally to Senator McClellan's May 14
request for Commissioner Dann to comment on S. 2504[C.P.]. s
95. "Individual Views of Senator John L. McClellan" sent to Senator Hugh Scott's Office,
June 27, 1974.
96. Id.
97. The idea for an ad hoc group arose following a speech by Bernard Nash, Assistant
Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, for Senator Philip Hart,
at the semi-annual meeting of the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel on June 3, 1974,
in Rhode Island.
98. Previously, there had been relatively few corporations totally embracing S. 2504 or S.
2504[C.P.], but by late July, a number of corporations, including General Electric, Mon-
santo, Merck & Company Inc., Zenith, Avco, Firestone, and Honeywell Inc. had indicated
general assent.
99. Letter from Commissioner of Patents C. Marshall Dann to Senator John L. McClellan,
July 3, 1974.
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Included in this response from Commissioner Dann was a 17-page
analysis of proposed amendments.' The letter represented a formal
approval of S. 2504[C.P.], although the submission of proposed
amendments seemed to indicate a less than complete endorsement
by the Patent Commissioner of the bill.' 1 This letter was supple-
mented by an additional letter of July 29, 1974, from Commissioner
Dann transmitting 15 more technical amendments to S.
2504[C.P.I102
On July 31, Senators Hart and Scott informally proposed further
amendments to S. 2504[C.P.], embracing many of the changes
advanced by Commissioner Dann, parts of the "Corporate Counsel
Markup," and recommendations of Senator Fong and Senator
McClellan which had not been accepted in earlier negotiations. 0
The letter stated in part:
In general, we are prepared to accept the over-whelming bulk
of the recommendations if you also find them reasonable. We
express the same hope you have on several occasions that a re-
sponsible and effective patent bill should be reported this session.
It is our understanding a bill including these changes would re-
ceive support from many responsible Corporations, portions of
the Patent Bar, private inventors, and would be in the best inter-
est of the general public and consumers.
As we all know, more than four years of work have gone into
bringing patent reform to this point. Even though time is growing
short, and it seems likely the House will not pass a patent bill
this session, we do believe there are good reasons for Senate ac-
tion. If S. 2504 can clear the Senate this year, it would assure a
good chance for early Senate passage next Congress and expedi-
tious House action. To achieve this, S. 2504 would have to be
ready for floor action within the next several weeks.' 4
100. Id.
101. Although there is little substantial evidence to support such speculation, the position
taken by Commissioner Dann may have been the result of a compromise between the position
of the Department of Commerce and that of the Departmentof Justice. If so, this compromise
would reflect ongoing disagreement in the executive branch concerning S. 2504 and S.
2504[C.P.I.
102. Letter from Commissioner of Patents C. Marshall Dann to Senator John L. McClel-
lan, July 29, 1974.
103. Letter from Senators Philip A. Hart and Hugh Scott to Senator John L. McClellan,
with a copy to Senator Hiram L. Fong, July 31, 1974.
104. Id.
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Unfortunately, the events of the following days made these efforts
unproductive. Within a week, President Nixon had resigned and
both the Congress and the Administration were caught up in a
whirlwind of changes which placed patent reform on the back
burner.105
PATENT LEGISLATION IN THE 94TH CONGRESS
The extensive work product and momentum for patent reform of
the 93d Congress remained when the 94th Congress convened on
January 14, 1975. No changes having occurred in the membership
of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights, efforts toward patent reform began immediately in
the Senate.
Chairman McClellan introduced his own patent reform package,
S. 23.'11 This bill closely tracked S. 2504[C.P.] of the 93d Congress
with the addition of the amendments proposed by the Administra-
tion in July 1974. It differed, however, from the Administration
position on several major points. For example, Senator McClellan
favored promoting the Commissioner to an Assistant Secretary of
Commerce," 7 although limiting him to "not more than two Assist-
ant Commissioners" ' 8 in addition to the Solicitor.' 9 S. 23 contained
several changes to section 102 of the patent code dealing with "nov-
elty and bars to patent,""10 but did not change the much-litigated
and well-understood section 103 which sets out the standard of in-
vention necessary for the issuance of a patent."' Senator McClellan
also favored amending section 112, involving the statutory require-
ment for disclosure;" 2 section 135, outlining opposition proceed-
105. The final event of the 93d Congress affecting patent reform was the introduction of
S. 4259, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), by Senator Fong on December 19. S. 4259 represented
Senator Fong's personal approach to patent reform which more closely resembled S. 2930
than S. 2504 or S. 1321.
106. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
107. Id. § 3(a)(1).
108. Id. § 3(c).
109. Id. § 3(d).
110. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1975), amending 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). See note
37 supra.
111. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sass. § 103 (1975), amending 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). See note
36 supra.
112. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (1975), amending 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970). Senator
McClellan would require more detailed disclosure in the specification filed by the applicant
for a patent.
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ings;"3 and sections 191 to 194, providing the option to an applicant
to defer examination of his application for a patent.'
Two other reform bills also were introduced upon the convening
of the 94th Congress. Senator Hiram Fong reintroduced the bill"5
that he had introduced in the 93d Congress less than a month ear-
lier. Soon afterward, Senator Philip Hart sponsored S. 473,116 which
did not contain as many far-reaching and innovative reforms as his
more controversial S. 1321 of the 93d Congress. Possibly the re-
straint evidenced in S. 473 was a sign of Senator Hart's willingness
to accommodate other members of the Subcommittee in an attempt
to move patent reform forward."1 7
At the request of the Administration, Senator Scott met on Jan-
uary 16 with Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent, Assistant
Director of the Office of Management and Budget Walter Scott,
Patent Commissioner C. Marshall Dann, Michael Kirk of the Pat-
ent Office, and General Counsel of the Commerce Department Karl
E. Bakke. Senator Scott agreed, at the Secretary's request, to rein-
troduce the Administration bill on the condition that he would not
feel compelled to support each section of the legislation, stressing
the need for accommodation to encourage swift Senate action. The
Secretary then advised Senator Scott that he would receive the bill
in the near future.
Nine weeks later Senator Scott received the bill from Secretary
Dent. Why such a long period elapsed between the meeting of Janu-
ary 16 and the official transmission of the legislation on March 20
still is not clear. It appears that some individuals within the Admin-
istration during this period once again attempted to raise controver-
sial issues which had been arbitrated earlier and already agreed to
at the White House. Senator Scott had expressed to Secretary Dent
113. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 135 (1975), amending 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1970). This section
provided for an opposition proceeding based on information brought to the attention of the
Commissioner by any person within 12 months after issuance of a patent.
114. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess §§ 191-94 (1975), amending 35 U.S.C.. §§ 191-94 (1970).
These sections provided that examination of an application for a patent would be deferred
automatically unless the applicant requests immediate examination or search and pays the
necessary fees. Under present law, there are no such provisions.
115. S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See note 105 supra.
116. S. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
117. Senator Hart stated when introducing his bill: "I believe we are close to a consensus
on the subcommittee and hope that the 94th Congress will enact legislation modernizing the
Patent Code." 121 CONG. IEo. 81482 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1975).
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at the January 16 meeting his hope that the bill he would receive
would be influenced by the numerous suggestions advanced by the
public during the study of S. 2504 during the 93d Congress; appar-
ently in response to this request, the proposed bill reflected the
changes to S. 2504 which had been contained in the official Admin-
istration suggestions of July 1974, and in general reflected adoption
of the previous Administration's position by the Ford Administra-
tion.
Senator Scott introduced the Administration bill on March 24,
1975, as S. 1308.118 In remarks on the Senate floor, he referred to it
as "the end product of more than 2 years of effort," and revealed
that it contained portions of S. 2504, S. 2504[C.P.], and other
Administration input."' His expressed hope was that the Subcom-
mittee could review it along with the bills previously introduced by
Senators McClellan, Hart, and Fong to find the best possible legis-
lation during the term of the 94th Congress. 2 '
COMPROMISE IN THE SUBCOMMVETEE
On May I the Subcommittee chose to use Chairman McClellan's
bill, S. 23, as the basis for reaching the Subcommittee's position.
During this continuing process of accommodation and compromise,
the objective of the Administration and Senator Scott was to incor-
porate certain key provisions from S. 1308 into the Subcommittee's
ultimate bill. In addition to the particular merits of the reforms that
would be effected, these provisions from S. 1308 evidence the impor-
tant common virtue that they are themselves studied compromises
of the differing approaches toward the four principal goals of patent
reform. Specifically these goals are increased quality and reliability
for United States patents, accelerated and improved disclosure of
new technology, simplification of procedures for obtaining patents,
and maintenance of the present substantive standards of patenta-
bility.
The patent clause of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress "To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to. . .Inventors the exclusive Right to
their Discoveries . *.".. ,121Under the statutory system devised to
118. S. 1308, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
119. 121 CONG. REC. S4931 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1975).
120. Id. at S4932.
121. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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effectuate the patent clause, the inventor of a device that is new,
useful, and a truly inventive step beyond that which was known
previously, is granted by the government a privilege which affords
to the inventor, for a limited time, a private legal cause of action
against others who make unauthorized use of the invention. 22 This
constraint upon the American commitment to open markets and
free competition is compensated by the benefit to the public in
the form of disclosure of new inventions that otherwise might have
been kept secret for economic exploitation.rs The physical and tem-
poral scope of protection should be no broader and no longer than
that necessary to serve the public interest in bringing forth inven-
tions inasmuch as the power of Congress to grant patents is limited
to that purpose. '? The guidelines for the Administration's proposed
reform included those constitutional purposes for the patent system.
Moreover, the proposal was drafted with the expectation that alter-
ations in procedure would breed less litigation regarding the effects
of the changes than would modifications in the substantive law of
patents, particularly if the adopted procedures were patterned upon
the time-tested Administrative Procedure Act.12s
Improvement of the Quality and Reliability of United States
Patents
Foremost among the four major goals of patent reform has been
the improvement of the quality and reliability of United States
patents. 6 This improvement can be accomplished by enhancing the
122. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 281 (1970).
123. "As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers
a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade
secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable
one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired
...... Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944). See
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
124. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 471, 484 (1917).
125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
126. See SuBcoMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEiARmS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. OF THE
JUDICIARY, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); Presidential Message
of Feb. 21, 1967, H.R. Doc. No. 59, 90th Cong., 1st Seass. IV (1967); Heaings on S. 643, S.
1253, and S. 1255 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 265 (1971) (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Richard W. McLaven).
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public confidence in the Patent Office and by improving the infor-
mation used in the patent approval procedure to increase the likeli-
hood that the patent will be upheld in any subsequent litigation.'27
The Administration supports several changes, some hovel and
some suggested in earlier bills, to enhance the public confidence in
the Patent Office. Under existing law, 1s and most earlier bills,m the
Commissioner of Patents was subordinated in a number of specific
ways to the Secretary of Commerce. S. 1308 eliminates that subordi-
nation'3" and expands the role of the Commissioner by making him
responsible for the administration of the Office, 31 for the appoint-
ment of officers such as the Deputy and Assistant Commissioners
and the Solicitor,3 2 and for prescribing regulations governing poten-
tial conflicts of interest for all officers and employees of the Office.'1r
The status of the Patent Office can be enhanced further by the
conferring of additional powers upon the Office. As would other
reformers, 34 the Administration would give the Patent Office the
127. To enforce his patent right to exclusive use, a patentee may bring a civil action against
an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1970). If a patentee brings such a suit, however, he subjects
his patent to scrutiny for determination of validity if the alleged infringer raises as his defense
the invalidity or misuse of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970). Although present law gives to
a patent the presumption of validity against the defense of invalidity in an infringement
action, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970), this presumption can be overcome. SeeAfter Blonder-Tongue,
supra note 36. See also, Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1942) (L. Hand
& Frank, J.J., concurring); Voorhees, supra note 36; Symposium onBlonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation-The Decision and Its Implications, 1971 AM.
PAT. L. Ass'Nu Bur. 718; Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back: Collateral Estoppel in Pat-
ent Litigation-A New Look, 18 VrL. L. REv. 207 (1972). Cf. Horn & Epstein, The Federal
Courts' View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF Soc'y 134 (1973).
128. 35 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
129. See S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. § 3 (1974); S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1971); S.
2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969); S. 1246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969); S. 3892, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1968); S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1967).
130. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975). S. 2504, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1974),
subordinated the Commissioner of Patents to the Secretary of Commerce, but S. 2504
[C.P.], 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1974), eliminated the subordination. Senator Fang's previous
bill, S. 4259, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1974), and his current bill, S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3 (1975), retained the subordination. Senator Hart's initial bill, S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), was the first bill to eliminate the subordination. His current bill also specifically
requires the Patent Office to act "independently" of the Department of Commerce in its
"rule-making, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions, including judicial proceedings." S.
473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1975).
131. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(1) (1975).
132. Id. § 3(b), (d), (e).
133. Id. § 4.
134. Senator McClellan would require some showing of good cause before a subpoena would
be issued. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23(a) (1975). The Fong bill would require issuance
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power to issue subpoenas and to take discovery'35 subject to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'35 It has been claimed that pres-
ently "[e]very federal agency except the Patent Office . . has, by
rule or statute . . subpoena power to compel relevant testimony
and document submission."'31 Another power heretofore lacking in
the Patent Office 3' but granted by S. 1308 is the authority to estab-
lish its own fees "designed to effect an overall recovery of 50 per
centum of the cost of the Office."' 3 9 Not only would the Office be
authorized to recover costs by 6harging traditional filing and exami-
nation fees, but it also would increase its efficiency by effectively
eliminating economically unproductive patents through the require-
ment that maintenance fees be paid during the life of the patent."0
The concept of the maintenance fee was advocated in the 93d Con-
gress in the bills sponsored by Senators Hart' and Scott, 2 and
each of the four patent reform bills of the 94th Congress has a
provision for maintenance fees.'
Public confidence in the operations of the Patent Office also
would be enhanced by a requirement 4 4 for the Office to conduct its
affairs more in accord with long-established procedures of other
administrative agencies adhering to the Administrative Procedure
Act.' 45 This provision first appeared in the Administration bill of the
through a United States district court. S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sees. § 24 (1975).
135. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23(a) (1975). S. 1308 would allow any member of the
Board of Examininers-in-Chief to issue a subpoena ex parte to the Solicitor, to parties to
interference or priority-of-invention proceedings, or, upon some good cause, to parties to
opposition proceedings.
136. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23(c)(1) (1975). See FED. R. Ci. P. 26-37.
137. Hearings on S. 1321 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1973) (statement by Edward
S. Irons, patent attorney, Washington, D.C.). Mr. Irons, in testimony, continued: "The
Patent Office lacks even the power to compel patent applicants to disgorge relevant facts of
which they may be possessed." Id. His general testimony includes some of the strongest and
most telling criticisms of Patent Office procedures.
138. Section 41 of the Patent Code established fixed fees to be charged by the Patent Office
with no specific reference to a relationship of recovery of fees to cost of operation. 35 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1970).
139. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41 (1975).
140. Id. § 41(f).
141. S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. § 41(c) (1973).
142. S. 2504, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(f) (1974).
143. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(f) (1975); S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 43 (1975);
S. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(f) (1975); S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(f) (1975).
144. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1975).
145. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1970). No similar requirement is imposed by S. 23, the
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93d Congress, S. 2504,46 and has been included in Senator Hart's
bill in the 94th Congress." 7 Increased public confidence also should
result from the requirement that the applicant have the burden of
justifying the grant and from adding to the adversary nature of
Patent Office proceedings by giving the Patent Office Solicitor dis-
cretion to participate in approval proceedings'-" and to investigate
possible violations of the Patent Code.""0
In addition to enhancing public confidence in the Patent Office
procedure, S. 1308 seeks to increase judicial confidence in the patent
by requiring a more complete record of the examination of a patent
application.1 51 Under section 132, for example, the Commissioner
may require that a written record be made of oral communications
made to an examiner.1 2 Additionally, the examiner must state for
the record his grounds for action taken on a patent application.5 3
Furthermore, amendments to applications which enlarge the scope
of patent claims must be identified specifically.'
Furthermore, the Administration proposal would increase the
adversary nature of the patent approval process by allowing a pri-
mary examiner or the Board of Examiners-in-Chief to request that
the Solicitor participate in any proceeding in order to protect the
public interest. 5 The Solicitor also has the authority to defend
appeals pending before the Board of Examiners-in-Chief,I to exer-
cise all rights that any other party can, including those of taking
depositions and testimony,57 and to conduct investigations to dis-
cover violations of the patent laws, rules, or regulations.' The con-
cept of an institutionalized adversary to the applicant appeared in
Senator Hart's bill of the 93d Congress where a similar function
bill selected for Subcommittee markup. In the belief that post-reform litigation could be
reduced by incorporation of familiar Administrative Procedure Act procedures, however, the
Administration is seeking inclusion of such a provision.
146. S. 2504, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1974).
147. S. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1975).
148. S. 1308, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 137 (1975).
149. Id. § (3)(d)(1).
150. Id. § 24.
151. Id. § 132.
152. Id. § 132(b)(3).
153. Id. § 132(c).
154. Id. § 132(e).
155. Id. § 3(d)(1).
156. Id. § 3(d)(2).
157. Id. § 3(d)(3).
158. Id. § 3(d)(4).
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would have been performed by a "Public Counsel."'5 9 The ability of
the Solicitor under S. 1308, however, to initiate appeals in favor of
the public interest before a patent has been issued is more limited
than that which would have been given by Senator Hart's bill' and
is much closer to the authority to initiate appeals in Senator
McClellan's current proposal."'
One final manner in which the Administration proposal would
improve the procedure for granting patents is by ensuring that the
decision to reject or approve aft application is based upon more and
better information.162 Section 122 provides for publication of patent
applications once issuance of a patent is requested,' and section
135 allows three months after publication for "any person" to notify
the Commissioner of any information relevant to the merit of the
applicant's claims.' 64 This method for increasing information in
opposition proceedings lies between Senator Hart's stronger bill of
the 93d Congress, which made applications public' 5 and allowed
notification anytime before issuance,'66 and the more cautious ap-
proach of Senator McClellan, who would keep applications secret
for 18 months'67 and allow notification of the Commissioner only
after issuance.' 8
The Administration proposal for opposition proceedings prior to
issuance of a patent is designed specifically to increase judicial con-
159. S. 1321, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(d)(1973).
160. Id. § 3(d)(2).
161. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (1975).
The Hart bill differed from S. 1308 and from Senator McClellan's S. 23 in that under Hart's
bill intervention by the Solicitor was discretionary whereas under the other two bills inter-
vention would occur only upon request.
162. It must be emphasized that even though the Patent Office should behave more in the
pattern of a typical administrative agency, the traditional role of the federal courts as final
arbiters of patent validity must be retained. Rather than performing a secondary review of
administrative action by the Patent Office, courts must consider de novo factors affecting
patentability (such as prior use or sale) that never may have been considered by the Patent
Office. Indeed the Patent Office, even with the proposed reforms, is ill equipped to discover
those factors on its own. See Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Prob-
lem of Administrative Law, 55 HAav. L. REV. 950, 959 (1942).
163. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122 (1975).
164. Id. § 135.
165. S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sees. § 122 (1973).
166. Id. § 135.
167. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Ses. § 122 (1975).
168. Id. § 135. Senator McClellan's bill would allow information regarding the merits of
the application to be submitted to the Commissioner within 12 months after issuance of the
patent. Id.
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fidence in the validity of issued patents.' 9 By allowing opposition
before issuance, section 135 subjects patent applications to in-
creased scrutiny to ensure that the exclusive right conferred by a
patent is as narrow as is proper. If no opposition were to be possible
until after issuance, there could be simultaneous court litigation
and Patent Office reexamination causing confusion and ousting the
federal courts from their proper role as final arbiters of patentabil-
ity." ' Section 135 minimizes harassment of an applicant while en-
couraging those who oppose issuance to present evidence which per-
haps would not be available otherwise to the Patent Office."'
Furthermore, the Administration advocates a variety of proposals
to ensure that the applicant fulfills the usual duties and responsibil-
ities of persons submitting ex parte information to the government.
For example, a review for completeness of a patent application to
ascertain whether the application taken as a whole is misleading is
required at or near the time the patent issues to assure that all
pertinent information is brought to the attention of the Patent Of-
fice while it retains jurisdiction over the application.17 2 This duty
is reinforced by requiring the early filing of a patentability memo-
randum. 173
Acceleration and Improvement of Disclosure of New Technology
The second major goal of comprehensive patent reform is acceler-
ated and improved disclosure of new technology. The basic premise
of the patent system is that the quid pro quo for protection of an
invention is the disclosure of the techniques and elements of the
invention to allow others to build upon the invention and enjoy its
169. See note 127 supra. Because Senator McClellan would delay opposition proceedings
until after issuance of the patent, see note 168 supra & accompanying text, the time for
beginning those proceedings continues as one of the unresolved issues of patent reform for
Congress.
170. See note 162 supra.
171. The Administration bill would provide better information for the patent system by
other provisions as well. To assure the availability of adequate technical and scientific data,
the Patent Office is to maintain a current and complete library, S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 6(a) (1975), with the help of other government agencies, id. § 6(b). Better liaison is to be
established with international organizations to increase the availability of understandable
translated foreign technology.Id. § 9(c). The Patent Office is instructed specifically to engage
in research and development to prepare for future information needs and to improve the
ability of the Office to search for'prior art. Id. § 10.
172. Id. § 115(a).
173. Id. § 131(b).
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full use when the patent expires.174 Even before expiration of a pat-
ent, disclosure should be adequate to provide opportunity for fur-
ther improvement in, and cross-fertilization of, technologies. Pre-
cise delineation of what is protected by the patent can provide oth-
ers with greater certainty in determining whether to proceed with
new ventures, while imprecise knowledge of the protected invention
encourages litigation and may frustrate legitimate business endeav-
ors.
Although present law requires the disclosure of the "best mode"
of carrying out an invention, 75 applicants may satisfy this require-
ment by presenting an operative example of the invention. '76 While
an operative example may aid in demonstrating utility,'7 it does not
necessarily disclose the "best mode . . . of carrying out""17 the
claimed invention. While several bills introduced during the past 10
years have suggested an increase in the number and specificity of
the requirements for disclosure, 9 none of the suggestions ade-
quately dealt with the problem of the submission of a mere opera-
tive example. S. 1308, however, would add meaning to the best-
mode standard by requiring disclosure sufficient to enable one with
ordinary skill in the art to utilize the invention within the trade or
industry,'0 thereby encouraging submission of the best model for
practical use.
By a provision first suggested in the Administration bill of the 93d
Congress,' 1 S. 1308 would require that the specification of invention
include a written description "of the novel and unexpected proper-
ties or results, and the old but superior properties or results, on
which the applicant will rely in seeking [or] upholding the grant
of the patent."'8 2 This provision appears necessary in light of deci-
sions allowing applicants to claim as a patentable product one
174. See note 123 supra & accompanying text.
175. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
176. MANUAL OF PAT. EXAMNING PRoC. § 608.1(h) (1974).
177. See note 38 supra; 37 C.F.R. § 1.92 (1974) (working model may be required by Patent
Office).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
179. See, e.g., S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (1975); S. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 112
(1975); S. 2504, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1974); S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (1973).
180. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 112(b) (1975).
181. S. 2504, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1974).
182. S. 1308, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 112(a)(2) (1975). Significantly, Senator McClellan's
bill omits the need for the patentee seeking to uphold his patent in court to rely upon novel
results cited to the Patent Office. See S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (1975).
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which was a combination of old or known products but which had
novel or unexpected properties in its new use."' To the extent that
such an invention is patentable, its novel or unexpected properties
or results should be disclosed fully to the Patent Office and public
to provide the proper quid pro quo."84 Any other new use of the old
product not yet discovered is patentable, and potential discoverers
of new uses should not be forced to speculate about what new uses
already are patented. Furthermore, a court subsequently adjudica-
ting validity of the patent as issued must know upon which "novel
or unexpected properties or results""' the applicant originally re-
lied. Without specific disclosure in connection with the patent ap-
plication, the patentholder later could justify issuance of the patent
by citing a new use subsequently discovered by himself or even
someone else, thus unfairly and improperly upholding the validity
of the patent."6
Other Leading Goals of Comprehensive Patent Reform
The Administration advocates several provisions aimed at the
third goal of patent reform, simplification of the procedure for ob-
taining a patent. For example, section 111(a) of the Administration
bill allows not only the actual inventor, but also the owner (by
assignment or otherwise) of the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented to file a patent application.' The bill also simplifies the
procedure for correcting an error or mistake in naming an individual
as inventor. 88
Particularly in view of the procedural changes contemplated, a
final goal to be considered in undertaking comprehensive patent
reform is to avoid lowering the substantive standards of patentabil-
183. See, e.g., Jeotfoy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 826 (1955); Robertson Rock Bit Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 176 F.2d 783, 790 (5th Cir.
1949).
184. See note 123 supra.
185. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (1975).
186. An apparent attempt to rely upon a new use discovered after the application was
thwarted by the Court in Lincoln Co. v. StewartoWarner Corp., 303 U.S. 645, 550 (1938), the
Court stating: "[TIhe respondent... urges that.., the [invention] performs a new and
different function .... The suggestion seems to be an afterthought. No such function of the
[invention] is hinted at in the specifications of the patent. If this were so vital an element
in the functioning of the apparatus it is strange that all mention of it was omitted." See also
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 25 (1965).
187. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(a) (1975).
188. Id. §§ 111(g), 256.
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ity. When the Administration bill' 9 was introduced into the 93d
Congress, President Nixon emphasized the importance of
"maintain[ing] present standards for the awarding of patents, in-
cluding the requirement that inventions serve a useful purpose. One
of the virtues of the American patent system is its emphasis upon
practicality-its demands that ideas be reduced to a tangible form
having a known usefulness before the public should grant a monop-
oly on the concept to the applicant."'9
One example of the concern for maintaining the substantive
standards of patentability is the retention in the current Adminis-
tration bill of the present requirement that all jointly named inven-
tors contribute to each claim of the patent application.'9 Most other
patent reform bills"9 2 have suggested eliminating this requirement
by, for example, provisions allowing joint application when "two or
more individuals have jointly made inventive contributions to the
subject matter of at least one claim of an application . ...
Eliminating the present requirement, however, would lower the
standard of invention, muddle the prosecution of the application
for, and litigation of, a patent and create a bias against individual
inventors.
The current standard of invention for issuance of a patent might
be lowered by eliminating the requirement of contribution to each
claim. If several inventors collaborated to produce an invention,
each individual might work on a different aspect of the invention
and make an obvious (and therefore unpatentable'94) advance over
prior art. The aggregate of the several advances, however, may ap-
pear to be a patentable nonobvious advance. Under present law,
189. S. 2054, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974).
190. 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1198, 1201 (1973).
191. S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 116 (1975). Because presently each claim is examined
separately by the Patent Office and each invention must be made by two or more persons to
apply jointly for a patent, 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1970), no patent will issue for a claimed invention
unless all named inventors have contributed to each claim of the invention. The reason for
the specific statement in S. 1308 requiring joint applicants to have contributed to each claim,
see S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(a) (1975), is that the inclusion of a provision allowing
a corporation to file for a patent, see id. § 111(a), created the need to emphasize the substance
of present law, namely, that a corporate applicant may name joint inventors only if each
inventor has contributed to each claim.
192. See, eg., S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. § 116 (1975); S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. § 116
(1975); S. 4259, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. § 116 (1974); S. 1246, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. § 116 (1969);
S. 3892, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 116 (1968).
193. S. 23, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 116(a) (1975).
194. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
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because the individual inventors would not be able to file a joint
application, no patent would issue for the aggregate invention. If the
requirement of contribution to each claim by every inventor were
eliminated, however, the individual inventors or their corporate
employer could obtain a patent for the aggregate invention."9 5
Moreover, application for and litigation of patents could be mud-
dled by eliminating the present requirement of joint inventorship.
Without that requirement, it would be difficult to ascertain what
prior art should be relevant to which of the joint inventors. 6 Only
through expensive discovery in litigation might the true inventor-
ship of each claim be established; yet, by the time litigation com-
mences, documentation of which joint patentholder was responsible
for which portion of the aggregate invention could be lost or de-
stroyed. Finally, a bias against individual inventors might result
from eliminating the requirement that each inventor contribute to
each claim. Individuals not working under one auspice would not be
able to aggregate routine advances to make a patentable invention,
and one person's work could be cited as prior art against the next
person's successive incremental improvement. Without the present
requirement, however, a joint inventor might share in a patent de-
spite his having contributed no more than a routine advance,, and
his co-inventors' work might not be cited against him.
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE HILL
The path of any comprehensive reform legislation is inevitably
long and difficult. A study of the course of patent reform efforts over
the last decade is particularly-illustrative of the roles of the princi-
pal participants in the legislative process: the executive branch,
195. Similarly, one person might make a patentable advance, and another person a trivial
improvement over that. If the two inventors could file jointly, a patent could issue for the
invention resulting from both advances, whereas under present law, the trivial advance would
not be patentable. In Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883), the Court explained that
it would harm technological growth to grant patents on any routine or trivial technological
improvement. The Court noted that the progress of the useful arts advances by a series of
small steps, each of which follows from similar prior steps and prepares the way for the next.
To grant a monopoly over any such slight advance, where no more than ordinary mechanical
or engineering skill is shown, "tends to obstruct more than stimulate invention" for it impedes
incremental improvements by placing a toll upon utilization of what has gone before to devise
what is to come. Id. at 200.
196. The present "novelty" requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970), prohibits the patenting
of developments dedicated to the public by others, although the inventor also may not patent
advances that he publicized himself more than one year prior to his patent application, id. §
102(b).
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pressure groups, and the legislative branch. The present Adminis-
tration's patent reform bill is itself a compromise package and
undoubtedly will contribute to the compromise package that Con-
gress ultimately will enact.
The Role of the Executive Branch
In analyzing the role of the executive branch in the legislative
process, it is important to realize from the outset that no Adminis-
tration is a one-minded monolith. A position taken by an Adminis-
tration on any particular issue is necessarily a delicately constructed
compromise among many diverse points of view. Although a unified
position regarding patent reform" finally emerged and now is sup-
ported by the Administration, the agreement was preceded by
nearly continuous conflict between the Commerce and Justice De-
partments.
Each Department has special interests concerning patent reform.
The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction over the Patent Of-
fice'97 and feels it has a better understanding of the administrative
needs of the Office than does any other governmental body; more-
over, it has an interest in representing its primary constituency, the
American business community. The concern of the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust and Civil Divisions is different from that of the
Commerce Department. These two Divisions deal with patents
after they issue and normally in court. They are concerned with
legal and economic problems associated with patents or their
commercial utilization, problems such as fraud, misuse, insufficient
search, and marketing abuse.
The difference in viewpoints of these two Departments accounted
for much of the conflict within the executive branch concerning
patent reform. The Justice Department argued for a more compre-
hensive change in the present law to tighten the procedure for grant-
ing patents. During recent years federal courts, often pointing to the
lack of information before the Patent Office at the time of its pat-
entability decisions, have demonstrated an inclination to invalidate
patents."' Consequently, the Justice Department sought more spe-
cific disclosures," 9 more specific oaths or statements by applicants
197. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 6 (1970).
198. See note 127 supra.
199. See note 186 supra & accompanying text.
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and their attorneys,'2 and pre-issuance opposition proceedings to
effect greater disclosure.20 ' The Commerce Department tended to
oppose detailed statutory requirements, preferring to allow greater
discretion to the Commissioner of Patents.
After promises of agreement are obtained through White House
arbitration, such intramural disputes usually are subsumed in a
unified Administration position, although the contesting parties
may continue to advance their respective arguments internally. On
the issue of patent reform it seems clear that the Commerce and
Justice Departments must each have lost some issues and won oth-
ers.202 Thus, even though the executive branch now presents a uni-
fied position on patent reform, disagreements undoubtedly remain
which could resurface. Given the strong executive branch support
of S. 1308 by President Ford's Administration, however, a break in
the present united front seems unlikely.0 3
The Role of Interest Groups
Throughout the protracted debate concerning patent reform, a
stream of ideas, amendments, and criticisms has been directed at
the decisionmakers from sources outside government. Because the
public generally is uninterested in the subject of patent reform, 2 4
comment primarily has been from patent lawyers. The lobbying
patent bar has been both articulate and well organized, acting
through the offices of major corporations that depend upon patent
protection, through professional patent groups and societies, and
through individual patent lawyers representing individual inven-
tors. The patent bar has worked with both local groups and national
organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers
and the National Chamber of'Commerce, the American Patent Law
Association, and sections of the American Bar Association. On the
200. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1970).
201. See notes 164-69 supra & accompanying text.
202. Perusal of the public speeches and congressional testimony by representatives of the
Commerce and Justice Departments over the past decade of debate concerning patent reform
will suggest the range of disagreements between the Departments.
203. The delay in resubmission of the Administration patent reform proposal to the 94th
Congress suggests that the Ford Administration did reevaluate its official position, but that
it decided after that review to adhere to the posit ion previously taken by President Nixon
and his Administration.
204. See note 56 supra. In this sense, patent reform has been an unusual issue, since the
general public can have a significant impact on the content of most legislation.
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local level, patent lawyers in private practice have been particularly
vocal because their entire livelihoods may depend upon continuance
of the patent system.
Generally, the patent lobby has favored minor changes rather
than the more innovative ideas such as pre-issuance opposition pro-
ceedings, maintenance fees, and deferred examination of patent
applications. Although not all of the more sweeping proposals are
necessarily beneficial, the patent bar has exhibited a general reluc-
tance to consider substantial change which the Administration has
recommended to improve the quality of issued patents. This reluc-
tance has been evidenced by repeated attempts to have Congress
accept specific legislation drafted wholly or largely by professional
patent organizations and reject bills written by the government
agencies responsible for the public consequences of the patent sys-
tem. These active lobbying efforts have included some extremely
valuable detailed analyses sent to Senators and Congressmen. Cor-
respondence has been augmented by frequent visits to legislators
and their staff by members of the patent bar, and by calls from
officers of large corporations explaining how important certain bills
are to their corporations. When all of these pressures are brought to
bear on an issue as relatively narrow as patent reform, they can have
a significant impact.
The Role of Congress
The task of Congress is to formulate a legislative package that
makes sense of the multiple factors involved and best serves the
public interest and the nation's complex economic system. Often,
as with the issue of patent reform, there are strong countervailing
pressures. The executive branch may seek blanket acceptance of its
proposal while interest groups are adamant that entirely different
legislation be enacted. As with the patent legislation, Congress may
move independently after reviewing the various alternatives.
Certainly Congress should not blindly accept legislation drafted
wholly outside the confines of Capitol Hill, because the hearing and
study process of the legislative branch is particularly helpful for
issues as complex as patent reform. Although bills drafted by an
interest group almost certainly will be slanted toward the particular
needs of, and economic benefit to be gained by, that group, some
members of the patent bar and representatives of corporations have
insisted that Congress accept the bill drafted by the patent bar on
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the ground that those who use and profit from the law daily know
it best and should, therefore, dictate what changes are to be made.
The authors feel strongly. that this posture should be rejected by
legislators, no matter what the legislation might concern. If it were
to prevail generally, patent lawyers would write patent law, bankers
would write banking legislation, and each special group could veto
legislation it does not like. Unfortunately, the Congress defers in
far too many cases, and bad law all too frequently results. The
legislative branch is composed of generalists from varying back-
grounds who daily make policy decisions in a multitude of complex
areas based on the best possible evidence available-that is the
way the system must function. Special interests may offer helpful
reactions, but they must not be permitted to usurp the legislative
function by being permitted to write the rules of the game govern-
ing'a complex society.
The long-awaited patent reform bill, if it emerges, hopefully will
be a compromise measure which will strengthen the patent system
in a meaningful way. The thousands of man-hours expended in the
last 20 years by all parties will be for naught, unless Congress itself
makes the necessary difficult choices.
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